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Abstract 
Does regulation of working hours at national and sector level impose straitjackets, or 
offer safety nets to employees seeking working-time flexibility? This article compares 
legislation and collective agreements in the metal industries of Denmark, Germany and 
the USA. The industry has historically been trend-setting for collective bargaining in all 
three countries, but with very different effects on working time. Organized 
decentralization seems to pave the way for fewer straitjackets, whereas the opposite 
seems to be the case with regard to disorganized decentralization.  
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Introduction 
 
In recent years, flexible working hours have offered a platform for new compromises between 
employers and employees at the workplace. Employers have pushed for the decentralization of 
collective bargaining on working hours to increase local competitiveness, whereas employees 
have called for more flexible scheduling of hours to balance their work and family life (Katz, 
1993; Marginson and Sisson, 2004).  
However, important challenges remain. National regulatory frameworks offer differing 
room for manoeuvre. In some countries, legislation and/or sectoral agreements on working 
hours are highly prescriptive and leave little room for variation at company level, imposing 
‘straitjackets’ on working-time flexibility. In others, national regulation is less binding and 
leaves more room for negotiation at company level. This can facilitate family-friendly working 
hours, but only if employees possess substantial bargaining power. If employees cannot exert 
effective influence over local management, they will be better off with more rigid national 
regulation. However, this does not necessarily mean a very detailed regulation of working 
hours. We also find examples of labour market regulation defining minimum standards, which 
offer employees a ‘safety net’. It is an empirical question whether or not such safety nets impose 
straitjackets. Even minimum standards which lack detailed content may still prescribe rules that 
work against the wishes of certain groups of employees.  
This article examines the effects of regulatory frameworks on working hours in 
Denmark, Germany and the USA, in terms of their level of detail (safety nets) and degree of 
completeness (straitjackets). All three countries have seen decentralization of collective 
bargaining; but in Denmark --- a case of organized decentralization --- this has not caused a 
significant decline in union density and collective agreement coverage, whereas disorganized 
decentralization in the USA has been associated with such a decline. Germany falls between the 
two: what started out as organized decentralization more and more resembles disorganized 
decentralization. These differences have had a significant influence on the regulation of working 
hours. When union density falls, employees lose significant bargaining power at company level, 
and unions might see it as impossible to avoid straitjackets on working hours without losing 
important safety nets at the same time.       
To limit the scope of analysis, I focus on the regulation of flexitime, the type of flexible 
working hours most requested by employees. I also focus on the metal industry, which has been 
trend-setting in the decentralization of collective bargaining in all three countries. The next 
section describes the methods and data used in the comparative analysis. I then present some 
general trends in flexible working hours and decentralization of collective bargaining in the 
three countries. This is followed by detailed analysis of the regulation of working hours in each 
of the three countries. Finally, the three cases are compared and the results are discussed. 
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Methods and data 
 
The study is primarily based on an analysis of academic literature and survey data from the 
three countries. In particular two surveys are used, the European Social Survey 2004 and the US 
Current Population Survey 2004, as they ask relevant questions in similar ways, present 
population-wide data and were conducted in the same year. Other relevant but less comparable 
survey data are used to support the analysis. I also draw on a number of background interviews 
with leading representatives of trade unions, employers’ organizations and lobbying groups 
covering the metal industry in Germany and Denmark (2005-06) and the USA (2007).  
 
  
General trends in flexible working hours and decentralization of collective 
bargaining  
  
Working time has always been a core issue of collective bargaining. However, the content and 
character of bargaining on working hours have changed dramatically within the last two 
decades. First, the focus has shifted from negotiating the weekly number of working hours to its 
timing (Marginson and Sisson, 2004; Seifert, 2005). Employers have increasingly seen flexible 
working hours as a means to increase productivity and make better use of new work 
organization, whereas employees have asked for more flexibility to obtain a better work-life 
balance (Bosch, 2001; Katz, 1993). Flexitime, the focus of this article --- flexible working time 
arrangement that (within limits) allow employees to vary their start and finishing times to fit 
their obligations outside work --- has in particular attracted employees. However, flexitime 
arrangements can also be attractive for employers who seek to recruit or retain employees with 
small children or other care responsibilities (Ilsøe, 2010; Wilson, 2001).  
Roughly half of employees in Denmark and Germany, in both public and private 
sectors, have access to flexitime, and about a quarter in the USA (see Table 1). The proportions 
are similar in manufacturing (which includes the metal industry). Flexitime is often 
implemented via personal time accounts, whereby employees can save up surplus hours and 
later spend them as time off in lieu. It usually involves increased employee influence over daily 
working hours and is often seen as an instrument to improve work-life balance (Deding et al., 
2006; Golden, 2001; Presser, 2006). This contrasts with other forms of flexible working hours 
such annualized hours, where the timing of work is controlled by management (Arrowsmith, 
2007). However, a number of studies have also questioned the level of employee influence in 
the implementation of flexitime. In some cases management can be reluctant to give up control 
(Ilsøe, 2010), whereas in other cases employees are unable to make use of flexitime because of 
heavy workloads (Lewis and Dulk, 2010). This suggests that flexitime is no guarantee of 
increased employee influence over daily working hours. 
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Table 1. Percentage of employees who can at least partially decide when to 
start/finish work (access to flexitime) 
 All sectors Public 
 
Private              Manufacturing 
All   
 
Denmark  52 41 49 48 
Germany 46 47 46 52 
USA 28 20 29 24 
Source: European figures from the European Social Survey 2004; US figures from the Current Population 
Survey 2004 (BLS, 2005a). 
 
 
Second, in line with demands for more flexibility, in many countries bargaining over 
working hours has been delegated from sectoral to company level. Indeed, the need to adapt 
working time to new forms of work organization has been a driver of the overall 
decentralization process (Katz, 1993), as employers push for local negotiations of hours to 
adjust work schedules to the changing needs of production. Unions have been more hesitant 
about decentralization of collective bargaining on working hours, even though local 
negotiations could also facilitate adjustment of work schedules to specific employee needs. For 
workers as well as employers to benefit from local bargaining over working hours, they need 
sufficient bargaining power. In countries characterized by disorganized decentralization, low 
union densities and poor coverage of collective agreements make it difficult for employees to 
articulate their needs (Traxler, 1995; Visser, 2006). Accordingly, unions can be reluctant to give 
up regulatory control of working time. This is the case in the USA, where we find a union 
density of 12 percent in manufacturing and only 7 percent in the private sector as a whole. The 
coverage of collective bargaining is only marginally higher than the union density (BLS, 
2005b). Such workers have little bargaining power at company level. Furthermore, if 
agreements are concluded, they are concluded at company level: disorganized decentralization 
does not indicate a move from a multi-employer to single-employer bargaining, as the latter has 
always predominated, but rather a fall in union density accompanied by a loss of horizontal 
coordination of company bargaining. This is especially true in the metal industry, where 
previously strong pattern bargaining has weakened in recent years (Kochan et al., 1994; Traxler, 
1995). 
One would expect unions to be more willing to delegate control of working hours in 
countries characterized by organized decentralization, if employees are well represented by 
unions at local level. This is the case in Denmark, where unions operate in an organized setting 
that supply employees with important local bargaining power. Three-quarters of employees in 
the private sector are covered by a collective agreement (DA, 2005), and around four out of five 
employees in Denmark are members of a trade union. Additionally, many employees are 
represented by on-site union representatives (shop stewards), who are allowed to conclude 
agreements with management: a recent survey found that four out of five manufacturing 
companies have shop stewards present. Even among smaller companies (20--49 employees), 
more than half have at least one shop steward on site (Ilsøe, 2009). The Danish system of shop 
stewards forms part of a long tradition of local pay negotiations that developed in the metal 
industry in the first half of the twentieth century and spread to other parts of the labour market 
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(Due et al., 1994; Navrbjerg et al., 2001). There is an articulated system of multi-level collective 
bargaining, with sectoral agreements (every 2--4 years in the metal industry) defining the 
framework for local negotiations at company level.  
In Germany, bargaining decentralization is becoming increasingly disorganized, or as 
some define it, controlled, as the sectoral organizations (especially the unions) acquiesce in 
decentralization but seek to exert some control over developments at company level (Haipeter, 
2009; Schulten, 2005). Hence there is greater union scepticism towards decentralization of 
working time regulation. Though the coverage of collective agreements remains high, at around 
60 percent, the proportion has been falling significantly, as has union density which is now 
under 20 percent (Dribbusch, 2005b; Visser, 2006). Manufacturing workers (and public sector 
employees) are somewhat better organized than the average. However, high collective 
agreement coverage does not tell the whole story, since there has been a move from multi-
employer towards single-employer bargaining as membership of employers’ associations falls. 
Only about half of all private sector employees are now covered by sectoral agreements (Ellguth 
and Kohaut, 2010). Furthermore, sectoral agreements increasingly include ‘opening clauses’ 
which allow works councils or company-level union representatives to negotiate agreements 
which may in some circumstances derogate from the sectoral standard. While most larger 
companies have works councils, this is not the case in smaller private companies (Dribbusch, 
2005b; Ellguth and Kohaut, 2005), and where they do exist they do not necessarily guarantee a 
union presence at the workplace. Union weakness at company level is illustrated by survey 
findings where more than four-fifths of works councillors report that decentralization has 
strengthened the position of the employer (Dribbusch, 2005b). The contrasting characteristics of 
decentralization in the three countries are set out in Table 2. 
 
  
Table 2. Three different forms of decentralization 
 
 Coverage of 
collective 
agreements 
Union 
density 
Presence of 
workplace union 
representatives 
Type of decentralization 
 
 
Denmark High High High Organized  
Germany High/medium Low Uneven Controlled  
USA Low Very low Low Disorganized  
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Regulation of working hours in the Danish metal industry 
 
In Denmark the regulation of working hours has traditionally been exclusively a matter of 
collective bargaining. This principle was threatened by the 1993 EU Working Time Directive, 
which was initially implemented solely by collective agreement. After a threat of legal action by 
the European Commission, the Working Environment Act (Arbejdsmiljøloven) was amended to 
regulate the working time of those not covered by agreements.  
In the metal industry, working hours for manual workers are regulated by the Industry 
Agreement (Industriens overenskomst); white-collar workers are covered by a separate 
collective agreement (Industriens funktionæroverenskomst), which has similar rules on working 
time. As well as the metal industry, both agreements cover a range of manufacturing industries 
represented by CO-industri, a ‘cartel’ of eight manufacturing trade unions, and DI, the private 
sector employers’ organization. The agreements prescribe a normal working week of 37 hours, 
which is also the case for most other sectors in Denmark. 
The Industry Agreement offers wide scope for local negotiations on flexible working 
hours, on condition that a local shop steward is present and can reach an agreement with 
management on the issue. During the 1990s the options for local negotiations on selected forms 
of flexibility such as flexitime were expanded, and today it is possible to conclude local 
agreements on time accounts with reference periods of up to 12 months (Navrbjerg et al., 2001: 
18). In 2000 a ‘pilot scheme’ was introduced, which made it possible to deviate completely 
from the chapter on working hours in the sectoral agreement. Initially, the use of this scheme 
required control and acceptance by the sectoral parties. However, these requirements were 
removed in 2004 and there is now only an obligation to inform the parties at sector level.  
Today, the exact type of working-time flexibility applying at the workplace is typically 
negotiated at company level between management and shop stewards. Recent surveys show that 
86 percent of manufacturing companies covered by the sectoral agreement have concluded one 
or more agreements on working hours, in half these cases involving flexitime. Most of these 
agreements (more than three-quarters) cover all or most employees at the workplace where they 
apply (Ilsøe, 2009: 53, 73). 
Decentralized bargaining on working hours in Denmark dates back to the 1980s, when 
representatives of trade unions and employers’ organizations in the industrial sector were faced 
by an increasing number of ‘closet agreements’ at company level. Both employers and 
employees felt a need to negotiate more flexible working hours, but their agreements were more 
or less concealed because the sectoral agreement did not allow much deviation on working time 
arrangements. Surveys from the mid-1990s suggested that one in four companies in the 
industrial sector had one or more closet agreements, and that a substantial proportion of these 
concerned local working hours arrangements (Navrbjerg et al., 2001: 26). In many ways, 
decentralization on working hours in Danish industry can therefore be said to have started from 
the bottom up. However, during the 1990s both unions and employers’ organizations found an 
interest in agreeing on opening clauses that allowed negotiations on working hours at company 
level within the frame work of the sectoral agreement. According to a representative of DI, the 
opening clauses on working time secured ‘orderly conditions’ while still providing the 
flexibility wanted by employers (interview, DI, June 2005). Unions accepted this radical 
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decentralization of working time regulation, as it proved possible at the same time to introduce 
supplementary benefits such as occupational pensions and extra holidays for everyone covered 
by the sectoral agreement (interview, CO-industri, June 2005).  
Nevertheless, the primary reason why the unions could approve the decentralization of 
working time regulation was workers’ strong bargaining power at company level (interview, 
CO-industri, June 2005), and this is still the case. This bargaining power is supported not only 
by high union density and high coverage of collective agreements, but also by a strong 
organization of shop stewards, who are elected by union members at the workplace and have 
extensive bargaining competence.  
There is no doubt that the radical decentralization of collective bargaining on working 
time in Danish industry has contributed significantly to the prevalence of flexitime agreements 
at local level. Many employees are covered by such agreements and derive benefits from them. 
Both employers and shop stewards report a number of positive effects of these agreements, 
including increased satisfaction, easier recruitment of employees, improved work-life balance 
and social inclusion (Ilsøe, 2009: 71). This indicates that few straitjackets remain in the 
regulation of working hours in the Danish metal industry. Unions have not feared losing central 
control, as the high presence of shop stewards (even in smaller companies) supports workers’ 
local bargaining power. It is difficult for employers to force employees to accept working time 
arrangements that do not at least partially satisfy their wishes. However, there is still a 
substantial proportion of companies (around sixty percent) without flexitime agreements. Many 
of these might have informal flexitime arrangements, as was the case in many companies in the 
1980s, but we do not know how many and with what effects. Furthermore, agreements on 
flexitime do not seem to be accessible to all groups of employees, as roughly a quarter of the 
agreements do not cover all employees at the workplace. 
In conclusion, the regulation of working time in the Danish metal industry can be 
described as a comprehensive but also incomplete regulation, leaving considerable room for 
manoeuvre at company level. Unions neither perceive the regulation as a straitjacket nor as a 
safety net. Instead, they stress the importance of their own local bargaining power. Employees 
are well represented by unions in most companies because of high density levels and an 
extensive presence of shop stewards. Unions therefore feel generally confident that local 
negotiations on working hours are to the benefit not only of employers but also employees. 
 
 
Regulation of working hours in the German metal industry 
 
German regulation of working time involves a mixture of legislation and sectoral agreements. 
According to the Arbeitszeitgesetz (Working Time Act), a working day should not normally 
exceed eight hours, but may be extended to ten hours if the average working day over six 
months is kept within eight hours. However, the act allows unions and employers’ organizations 
at sector level to agree on a different reference period (12 or 24 months), as long as the hours 
worked do not breach the rule of 11 unbroken hours of rest per day or the maximum of 48 
weekly working hours prescribed in the EU Working Time Directive.  
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Sectoral bargaining in the German metal industry takes place in seven different regions 
(Bezirke), where separate collective agreements are concluded. Consequently, the sectoral trade 
union and the employers’ organization coordinate horizontally to ensure homogeneity of 
agreements in the different regions. Typically a trend-setting ‘pilot’ agreement is concluded in 
Baden-Württemberg or Nordrhein-Westfalen, and is then copied in the other regions. This is 
also the case regarding working time regulations. An important exception is that normal 
working hours are 35 a week in the western Germany and 37 in the east. 
There are three significant collective agreements on working time in Baden-
Württemberg. First, the basic framework agreement in the industry (Manteltarifvertrag für 
Beschäftigte) allows negotiations on flexible working hours with a reference period of six 
months; surplus hours can be taken as time off in lieu. This opening clause makes it possible for 
local works councils and management to negotiate works agreements (Betriebsvereinbarungen) 
on flexible hours within certain limits. Second, the ‘Pforzheim agreement’ signed in March 
2004 and extended in 2008 as the Tarifvertrag zur Beschäftigungssicherung und zum 
Beschäftigungsaufbau (agreement for protecting and increasing employment) made it possible 
to deviate more radically from the framework agreement including all aspects of working hours. 
This enabled company agreements that go beyond the text of the sectoral agreement 
(Ergänzungstarifverträge), and similar clauses were rapidly agreed in the other bargaining 
regions. However, resort to the Pforzheim agreement requires approval by the regional offices 
of the bargaining parties, IG Metall and Gesamtmetall, who also participate in the bargaining 
process together with the works councils. Third, in February 2005 the bargaining parties signed 
the Tarifvertrag zur Änderung der Manteltarifverträge und der Tarifverträge zur 
Beschäftigungssicherung in Baden-Württemberg, reformulating part of the framework 
agreement on working hours. The primary aim was to address the regulation of flexible working 
time as a mechanism to safeguard jobs and avoiding unnecessary hiring and firing. This 
reformulation was unique in that it was the first agreement in Germany to allow negotiations on 
working time accounts with no obligatory reference period. However, it stated that the company 
bargainers had to agree an upper and lower limit on the time accounts instead.  
A survey of works councillors in the German private sector, undertaken by the union-
linked Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI), suggests that these and similar 
opening clauses on working hours have been widely used, as nearly half of the companies 
covered by collective agreements have reached accords on flexible working time arrangements 
(Dribbusch, 2005a). This figure includes agreements on both flexitime and on annualized hours. 
However, interviews at the local IG Metall office in Baden-Württemberg and the head office in 
Frankfurt (May and June 2005) indicated that the union has been sceptical about 
decentralization of working hours and insists on controlling the application of the Pforzheim 
Agreement. The union has in general been reluctant to devolve bargaining competencies and has 
only agreed to decentralization of working time regulation in order to retain a minimum of 
control over developments at company level: during the late 1980s and early 1990s, company-
level deviation from sectoral agreements on working hours spread across the industry, and there 
was relatively little the union could do to prevent this. This became even more difficult during 
the 1990s, where growing signs of erosion within the German collective bargaining system were  
leaving workers with less bargaining power at company level than before (Hassel, 1999).  
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In spite of the extensive options for local negotiations on working time flexibility, many 
employers still see the regulation of working hours as too rigid (interview with representative of 
Südwestmetall, June 2005). In a survey of members of the employers’ organizations in the metal 
industry, more than half of small and medium-sized companies expressed dissatisfaction with 
these regulations (Behrens, 2002). However, working hours might not be the real reason for 
dissatisfaction. Wage-setting in the German metal industry is first and foremost a matter of 
sectoral bargaining, and has not been decentralized in the same way as working time scheduling. 
It can therefore be argued that the argument over working time regulation is a disguised attack 
on centralized wage determination. Although the Pforzheim Agreement made it possible for 
employers to reduce labour costs, for instance by increasing working hours without wage 
compensation, it is mainly larger companies that have succeeded in concluding such 
arrangements with the unions (Gesamtmetall, 2005; Seifert and Massa-Wirth, 2005). From a 
union perspective, the price of fewer straitjackets on working hours might be a less efficient 
safety net on wages, and they are therefore willing to accept deviations on working hours that 
affect pay levels, primarily because larger numbers of workplaces are at risk. 
Summing up, the regulation of working hours in the German metal industry is quite 
detailed with both substantive legislation and sectoral agreements. However, the extensive 
possibilities for local negotiations make regulation rather incomplete and few straitjackets on 
working hours should therefore remain. However, employers still express a wish of further 
decentralization that unions reject. One reason to this could be that the regulation of working 
hours in practice works as a safety net on pay, helping unions protect low-wage workers. 
Unions might fear that further decentralization of working time regulation would result in even 
lower pay levels for this group of workers. 
 
 
Regulation of working hours in the American metal industry 
 
In the USA, working hours are regulated by the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which 
limits standard weekly working hours to 40. All hours exceeding this limit must be paid as 
overtime (at time-and-a-half). This means that employers have little interest in introducing 
flexible working hours that goes beyond the standard work week; they prefer the use of regular 
overtime rather than paying overtime rates for working time flexibility, and bargaining options 
for employees on flexitime (which is termed ‘comp time’ in the USA) are therefore limited 
(Golden and Jorgensen, 2002; Jacobs and Gerson, 2000). As the FLSA is national legislation, 
the 40-hour rule applies to the metal industry, manufacturing in general and most other private 
and public industries. Exemptions are few and include certain forms of work like executive 
functions and certain industries like farming and fishing.  
Polls have indicated that many employees request more flexible working hours than is 
currently possible, in order to combine work and family life more effectively (Golden, 2003: 2; 
Walsh, 1999: 86). However, it is employers, not unions, who have argued for reforms of the 
FLSA. Since the mid-1990s a number of Republican members of Congress have proposed 
amendments that would give employers easier access to implementing flexible working hours. 
Many of these amendments would facilitate the introduction of comp time for private sector 
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employees. Instead of employers paying overtime rates for hours above 40 per week, it is 
suggested that these hours should be banked at overtime rates, allowing employees to take an 
hour and a half hours off in lieu for each excess hour worked (Felder, 2005: 279-80; Vance, 
2002: 316-7). These amendments are inspired by the options in the public sector, where 
supplementary legislation (Federal Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act, 
FEFCWA, 1978) allows federal employees greater scope for working time flexibility. The Act 
introduced two forms of working time flexibility: comp time, where employees can bank up to 
24 hours over a two-week period to take as time off in lieu in the following two weeks (with no 
supplementation); and compressed work schedules, which allows 80 working hours to be 
distributed across fewer than 10 working days within a two-week period. This latter option can 
be used for instance to create work weeks of four ten-hour days.  
I conducted interviews with a lawyer who has represented many employers in legal 
cases on working hours (June 2007), and with a representative of the National Association of 
Manufacturers (July 2007), a large lobbying group for manufacturing employers. Employer 
arguments for introducing comp time have been many, but most pronounced are those for 
greater scope to offer employees family-friendly working hours (Vance, 2002: 316; Walsh, 
1999: 84-5). Female labour market participation has increased dramatically since the FLSA was 
introduced in 1938, and employers are interested in offering family-friendly working schedules 
to recruit and retain female workers and male workers from dual-career families with children. 
Others argue for more flexible scheduling of hours to adjust to new forms of work organization 
involving flat hierarchies and team work (Walsh, 1999; Wilson, 2001). Finally, some private 
employers address the issue of FLSA and costs, arguing that comp time would make it possible 
to reduce overtime payments (Walsh, 1999: 87).  
Academics, as well as unions, have been more sceptical towards the introduction of 
comp time for private sector employees. First of all, empirical evidence suggests that it is 
already possible to negotiate a number of flexible working time arrangements under the current 
legislation without imposing costly overtime payments on employers. This includes collective 
agreements on comp time within the working day or week, compressed work weeks and the so-
called 80/9 schedule, which provides for eight nine-hours days and one eight-hour day followed 
by a three-day weekend every fortnight (Golden, 2003: 1; Ilsøe, 2008: 46-7; Walsh, 1999: 91-
2). Furthermore, evaluations of the FEFCWA in the public sector have reported not only 
positive effects such as improved work-life balances, easier recruitment, increased employee 
satisfaction and reduced absence, but also about important problems (GAO, 2002). Academics 
have addressed two areas of concern in particular. First, public employees often bank surplus 
hours that they are never able to take as time off in lieu, which means that comp time is not 
necessarily more family friendly than overtime. Second, and perhaps explaining the first 
problem, public employees are not granted more control over the timing of hours than under the 
FLSA (which allow employers to dictate overtime work), and this can form a barrier to the 
reconciliation of work and family life (Golden, 2003: 4; Walsh, 1999: 110-1).  
Many argue that this lack of control will have severe consequences if comp time is 
introduced to the private sector, where union density is substantially lower than the 36 percent 
found in the public sector. Although workers in manufacturing are slightly better organized than 
in the private sector in general (12 percent compared to 8 percent), this still leaves them with 
little voice over working time issues in relation to management. Case studies have underlined 
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that union representation is of key importance if the introduction of flexible working hours is to 
improve employees’ work-life balance (Gerstel and Clawson, 2001; Bigler, 2002). The FLSA 
does not grant workers a right to refuse overtime working, but unionized workers are more 
likely to have a contract that establishes rules for requesting overtime. Conversely, if union 
presence at a company is low or non-existent, it is more likely that management will dictate 
rather than negotiate the flexibility needed. The risk that banked hours are left unused (and 
unpaid) is therefore much higher in the private than in the public sector (Golden, 2003: 1-6; 
Walsh, 1999: 126-7).  
I discussed the implications of introducing comp time in the private sector in interviews 
with a representative of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers 
(IAM) in May 2007 and separately with two representatives of the AFL-CIO in June 2007. 
They indicated that their primary concern is not how the lack of control will affect the 
scheduling of working hours, but rather that an amendment to the FLSA will affect the income 
of working families and the creation of full-time jobs (AFL-CIO, 2007). As real wages for US 
workers have been falling over the past decades, many of them depend heavily on overtime pay 
(Mishel et al., 2007). About a quarter of employees in manufacturing work more than 50 hours 
per week, and overtime pay therefore forms a substantial part of their monthly income (Golden 
and Jorgensen, 2002: 6). It has therefore been suggested that any reform of the FLSA should 
include an hourly wage threshold for eligibility for comp time. Such a threshold would make it 
possible to allow comp time for those workers who can afford it, and protect those workers who 
cannot (Felder, 2005). However, this would not necessarily solve the question of control over 
the scheduling of hours. Workers with wages above the hourly threshold could still be forced 
into working surplus hours that they never get the chance to take as time off in lieu, as many of 
them are not unionized. Furthermore, such a reform could still have a negative impact on the 
number of workplaces. Unions still highlight that one of the main targets of the FLSA was the 
creation of new jobs. The 40-hour limit was set in order to encourage employers to open new 
full-time positions rather than to solve staffing problems through excessive use of overtime 
hours. If this limit is removed or changed, unions believe it will have a negative effect on job 
creation (AFL-CIO, 2007). 
In conclusion it can be said that although the content of the FLSA is simple and not 
very detailed, it still stands out as a complete regulation with regards to working hours in the 
metal industry (and most others parts of the private sector). It does not allow deviations to be 
negotiated at local level, and polls suggest that many employees see the current FLSA 
regulation as a ‘straitjacket’ which frustrates their wishes for family-friendly working hours. We 
also find employers who would like to introduce comp time to attract employees with small 
children, as they find this difficult under the current regulation. However, unions primarily see 
the FLSA as one of the few remaining ‘safety nets’ to secure jobs and income levels among 
working families in the private sector. Low union density makes it extremely difficult for unions 
to negotiate higher wages and contribute to job creation in other ways, and therefore they still 
see the FLSA as an important protection for employee rights. The question is, of course, 
whether this represents the view of all employees. It might well be those employees who earn 
the most who express a wish of more flexibility, whereas low-wage workers have their primary 
focus on the effects on pay. 
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Comparative analysis 
  
Today, employees in many countries desire more flexible working hours that would facilitate a 
better balance between work and family life. However, surveys show that access to flexible 
work-time arrangements varies significantly across countries. This is the case when comparing 
manufacturing workers (including those in the metal industry) in Denmark, Germany and the 
USA. Around half the Danish and German workers report such access, but only one in four of 
American workers. An important explanation for this variation is the different processes of 
decentralization in these three countries. This is reflected in union responses to employees’ 
desires for working-time flexibility and in the content of the regulatory frameworks on working 
time at national or sectoral level, which leave Danish and German metal workers with the 
largest room for manoeuvre in local negotiations on working hours. Under the FLSA, American 
workers are faced with a tighter ‘straitjacket’ constraining their possible wishes for working-
time flexibility. Nevertheless, not only American but also German unions are concerned that the 
regulation on working hours at central levels should provide a ‘safety net’ for workers, whereas 
this appears less important to Danish unions.  
The Danish metal industry is characterized by high union densities, high coverage of 
collective agreements and a wide presence of shop stewards. In this setting of organized 
decentralization, unions have agreed on a strong devolution of bargaining competencies over 
flexible working hours from the sectoral to the company level. A number of opening clauses 
have been introduced in the sectoral agreement, and there is no demand for approval of 
company agreements by the parties at sector level. Surveys have shown that the large room for 
manoeuvre at company level has been to the benefit of many employees, in both larger and 
smaller companies. Although regulation is quite detailed, few straitjackets remain, and unions 
feel confident that managers and employees are able to negotiate balanced agreements on 
flexitime. However, it should be mentioned that a substantial group of companies has not 
concluded such agreements. Furthermore, agreements do not always cover all employees at the 
workplace, and some employees might therefore still experience ‘straitjackets’ with regard to 
the regulation of their own working hours. 
In the German case, bargaining competencies on flexible working hours have been 
delegated both from national legislation (the Arbeitszeitgesetz) and from sectoral agreements to 
the company level through opening clauses. The regulation of working time is very detailed, but 
it also contains a wide range of options for local negotiations that render it incomplete in 
character. However, as union density and the presence of works councils among SMEs have 
been declining over the past decades, unions have been cautious to give up control over the 
regulation of working time at company level. The situation in Germany can be characterized as 
controlled decentralization, where the use of a number of opening clauses still requires approval 
from the sector bargaining parties. The effect is fewer regulatory ‘straitjackets’ but mainly for 
employees at larger companies, where works councils are present and unions are more willing 
to accept local negotiations.  
In the American metal industry, low union densities, poor coverage of collective 
agreements and little presence of union representatives make if difficult for employees to 
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articulate their needs because of limited bargaining power. In this environment of disorganized 
decentralization, only minorities of workers have access to flexible working hours. Unions have 
opposed a suggested reform of the national legislation on working time, the FLSA, that could 
make it more attractive for employers to introduce working time flexibility. The reform would, 
within certain limits, allow local negotiations on working hours and thereby make the content of 
the FLSA less complete. However, unions fear that a reform will cause a significant loss in 
income among workers, and discourage employers from creating new jobs. Even though polls 
suggest that the FLSA imposes a ‘straitjacket’ on employees’ desire for more family-friendly 
working hours, unions are not willing to pay the price of losing an important ‘safety net’ with 
regard to the income levels of working families and job creation. 
This comparative analysis of the regulatory frameworks on working hours has shown 
that one aspect is of decisive importance when it comes to determining whether regulation 
serves as a straitjacket or a safety net: union power at local level. If workers are not organized 
and well represented by unions at their workplace, unions will be unlikely to see 
decentralization as a mechanism which can improve employees’ choice of their own working 
hours. In other words, they do not considerable it possible to abandon the straitjacket without 
losing important safety nets at the same time. This is true for the American metal industry, 
where unions oppose the loss of the straitjacket of the not very detailed regulation on working 
hours of the FLSA. Conversely, if workers are organized and covered by agreements and local 
union representatives, unions are more willing to introduce opening clauses to the legislation 
and sectoral agreements, so as to allow working hours to be negotiated at company level. In 
these cases, unions can see decentralization as an option for adjusting working hours to the 
needs of employees, and they are willing to abandon the straitjacket of regulation at central 
levels. Such a development can be observed in the Danish and, to some extent, the German 
metal industries.   
Straitjackets and safety nets on working hours seem to coexist with, not replace, one 
another. The comparative analysis indicates that unions are more willing to let go of 
straitjackets on working hours where safety nets are less necessary (in other words, where 
unions have a strong platform at company level). This also includes safety nets on pay, to which 
we turn in the final section. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
Flexible working hours --- and especially flexitime --- are often considered a ‘soft’ issue in 
collective bargaining, as flexible working hours can help to improve employees’ work-life 
balance or their so-called combination security (Wilthagen, 2002). But the organization of 
working time can be a ‘hard’ issue in reality. Both the American and German cases suggest that 
the question of working hours is closely related to those of pay and employment levels (pay 
flexibility and job security). This means that losing ‘straitjackets’ on working time might result 
in the loss of important ‘safety nets’ in other areas. Among other problems, a decentralization of 
the regulation of working hours can entail greater decentralization of wage determination. In a 
context of falling union density this can make unions fear that employers will surreptitiously 
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impose lower wages through the back door of more flexible working hours. This is the case in 
Germany, where unions at sector level want to control the mainly local organization of working 
hours to sustain centralized wage determination. The situation in the USA is to some extent the 
reverse, but for the same reasons. Here, unions seek to keep the regulation of working hours at 
central level to compensate workers for unsustainable pay levels regulated at local level. It 
remains an open question whether this fear of further decentralization among unions in 
Germany and the USA is based on sound evidence or just expectations. Surveys from different 
sectors in the UK have indicated that decentralization of collective bargaining on pay and 
working time does not lead to greater pay inequality (Arrowsmith and Sisson, 1999).  
Both the German and American stories tell us that the level of regulation of working 
hours is of great importance to unions, when union density is low. However, this first and 
foremost has to do with the potential impact of the decentralization of working hours on pay 
levels. Only in the Danish case, where union density remains high and most companies have 
shop stewards present, have unions been willing to accept a radical decentralization of 
bargaining on both pay and working hours. These two elements of organized decentralization, 
high union densities and presence of on-site union representatives, therefore seem to be 
important preconditions for unions to give up control and for employees to lose national or 
sectoral ‘straitjackets’ over working time. Not only because they supply employees with local 
bargaining power over working hours, but also, and perhaps more importantly, because they 
supply employees with local bargaining power over pay. 
To add complexity, the analysis of the American and German cases suggests that such 
interaction between working-time flexibility and pay flexibility (and probably also job security) 
is unevenly distributed among employees. Workers in companies with pay levels above average 
who feel secure about their jobs might be interested in negotiating flexible working hours, 
whereas working-time flexibility can be a threat to workers on low wages and with a fear of job 
loss. The first group might see the national regulation of working hours as straitjackets, while 
the second group might value the safety net that such regulation gives them in respect to pay. 
However, this difference of interest does not necessarily follow the line between ‘insiders’ 
(organized and skilled workers) and ‘outsiders’ (unorganized and unskilled workers) (Atkinson, 
1987; Dobbie, 2006; Lindbeck and Snower, 2001). The analysis indicates that we also find 
differences within the group of insiders, and unions are faced with the challenge of representing 
diverse interests on working hours among organized workers.  
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